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Abstract
Goods and services vary along a number of dimensions independently. Customers
can choose to acquire information on the quality of some dimensions and not others.
Their choices aﬀect firms’ incentives to invest in quality and so lead to indirect ex-
ternalities in consumers’ choices. We illustrate these ideas in a simple model with
a monopolist selling a product with two characteristics, investments in quality with
stochastic realizations and heterogeneous consumers. A fall in the cost of acquiring
information on the quality of one characteristic leads more consumers to verify that
characteristic. Consequently, the firm may under-provide quality on the other. This
may paradoxically reduce consumer surplus, profits and welfare. Our discussion con-
cludes with a number of potential extensions and applications of the basic framework.
When shopping for goods with multiple characteristics that are not easily observable,
consumers’ decisions on what to observe and whether to buy aﬀect the type of good oﬀered
and, indirectly, other consumers’ welfare. Think of a prospective student deciding on a
business school. She is likely to be concerned by her expected salary on graduation and
also by long-term career prospects. Business schools can tailor their programs in ways
that aﬀect these diﬀerently. Historically, students have relied on talking to alumni and
on other independent research to gain relevant information. Business school guides and
1This paper was previously entitled “When cheap information harms consumers.” We thank a particu-
larly helpful audience at the NY Commuters’ IO day (2005), participants at ESSET 2005, Mark Armstrong,
Mariagiovanna Baccara, Alessandro Lizzeri, Volker Nocke, Laura Veldkamp and Lawrence White. Contact
info: Bar-Isaac: heski@nyu.edu; Department of Economics, Stern School of Business, NYU, 44 West 4th
street 7-73, NYC, NY 10012 USA; Caruana: caruana@cemfi.es; Casado del Alisal 5, 28014 Madrid, Spain;
and Cuñat: vicente.cunat@upf.edu; UPF, Ramon Trias Fargas 25-27, 08005 Barcelona, Spain.
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rankings have made it easier for students to learn average salaries on graduation but have
had little eﬀect on the information available on other dimensions. As a consequence, more
students may only investigate and make decisions based on average starting salaries. This
has induced business schools to tailor their programs to the rankings. As noted by popular
commentators, the overall eﬀect of this process may be detrimental for students.2 Similarly,
the easy availability of Robert Parker’s 100-point wine ratings–while benefiting many as
“a democratic, no-nonsense way of jettisoning the elitist jargon that veils quality from the
consumer” (Darlington (2005))–has also been criticized on the grounds that “Part of the
charm and beauty of wine is its idiosyncrasy, but when everybody tries to hit the same
sweet spot, it’s like making soda pop.” (Joel Peterson quoted in Darlington (2005)).
These are just two examples of a more general phenomenon. There are many goods
and services that are, by nature, multidimensional. Given that it is costly to verify all
the characteristics of a good, consumers often make purchase decisions based only on
partial information. Further, firms have to decide whether and how much to invest in
the quality of diﬀerent dimensions. These decisions take into account that consumers are
heterogenous in their search behavior. As a consequence there are indirect externalities
among consumers: In equilibrium, their individual choices aﬀect firm investments and
thereby other consumers. Our contribution in this paper is to highlight this mechanism,
its implications for investment incentives, consumer surplus, and welfare; and in particular,
to show that a drop in the costs of acquiring information can lead to a welfare loss.
We consider a market in which a monopolist sells a good with two characteristics,
investing separately in the quality of each. Investments lead to uncertain realizations, which
can only be observed by customers at a cost. So, customers may pay to assess quality before
deciding whether or not to buy the good. We show that a fall in the cost of assessing one
of the characteristics aﬀects welfare and in particular, it may be detrimental. Underlying
this result is the observation that there are inherent indirect externalities in consumers’
choices of which characteristic to assess. A simple revealed preference argument guarantees
that if the firm’s behavior is fixed then a fall in the costs of assessing one characteristic
unambiguously raises consumers’ welfare. This is not the case when the firm can vary
its investments in response to the fall in search costs. Consumers’ expected choices aﬀect
2Schatz (1993), for example, states that: “the rankings resulting from the surveys are too one-dimensional
to be taken seriously. Most likely, no single MBA program is best for everyone, and almost every program
is best for someone. The match has to be individualized.” (See also Education & Social Science Library
(2005) for a wide-ranging survey of critiques of school rankings.) In itself this observation need not imply
adverse welfare consequences; however, Schatz argues that: “people foolishly tend to believe that there is
significance to the order in which the schools appear”. Our model assumes that all agents are fully rational
but that information is costly. Without having to assume that people are foolish, we show that the rankings
are relevant but, through their easy availability, can have adverse consequences.
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the producer’s investments in the quality of each of the dimensions. However, customers
cannot commit to their choices and do not take into account their cumulative eﬀect on the
firm’s behavior.
Specifically, changes in aggregate consumer behavior aﬀect welfare in two diﬀerent ways.
First, a customer may assess a dimension, choose to buy the product and, on consuming,
find herself enjoying quality on the other dimension that she had not assessed. This quality
results from firm investments that cater to customers who assess that other dimension.
Through this externality, greater diversity in consumer behavior increases welfare.
The second eﬀect has an opposite implication. A customer may assess a dimension in
which quality is not realized and consequently choose not to purchase, even though the
firm has produced quality on the other unassessed dimension to attract a diﬀerent type
of buyer. This quality, which is produced but not consumed, suggests that diversity in
consumer behavior may also have a negative eﬀect on welfare.
The eﬀect of a fall in the customers’ assessment costs on the diversity of consumer
behavior depends on the initial conditions. Suppose first that most consumers are assessing
one characteristic, then a fall in the cost of assessing the other characteristic would lead
to greater diversity in consumer behavior. Alternatively, if initially most consumers assess
the second characteristic, then this fall in costs reduces diversity.
Overall, the eﬀect of a fall in search costs on welfare is ambiguous. Such a fall can either
reduce or increase the diversity of consumer behavior which, in turn, can either increase
or reduce welfare.
The papers most closely related to ours in spirit are Dranove and Satterthwaite (1992),
which presents a theoretical framework, and Dranove et al. (2001), which empirically
highlights negative welfare consequences of quality “report cards” on physicians. These
papers focus on producer behavior and use a general aggregate demand without considering
individual consumer behavior explicitly. Meanwhile, our focus is on consumers who play an
active role when choosing which information to acquire, and highlight how their individual
decisions aﬀect each other.
This work is also related to the multi-tasking literature that starts with Holmstrom
and Milgrom (1994), but there are crucial diﬀerences. They show that in a moral hazard
multi-task environment it is diﬃcult to provide strong and well-balanced incentives. If
eﬀorts are substitutes in the cost function, strengthening incentives in one dimension leads
to lower eﬀort on the other. The driving forces in our paper are diﬀerent for the following
reasons: (i) in contrast to their mechanism design approach, we analyze a situation in
which firm’s incentives arise endogenously from individual consumers decisions in a market
setting; (ii) we study a fundamentally incomplete contract setting, as both parties lack
3
important commitment abilities; and (iii) we do not assume substitution in the cost of
eﬀort.3
There are several papers that have highlighted other mechanisms through which allow-
ing for more information can be damaging for welfare. Schlee (1996) shows that making
more information publicly available might also benefit strategic rivals.4 Kessler (1998) il-
lustrates that committing to an information structure can change the resulting choice of
an explicit contract.5 Finally, Glazer and McGuire (2005) show that revealing a quality
index rather than its constituents can in eﬀect reduce the firm’s feasible choices in such a
way as to counter-act monopoly power.
Our discussion is also related to wider discussions on the benefits of diversity. Waldfogel
(2003) treats this issue empirically and focuses on product proliferation with heterogeneous
consumers. In his framework consumers benefit from the presence of more consumers with
similar preferences. We can get a contrasting result: In our setting verifying quality is
costly and therefore there is a benefit from diversity in consumer search, which arises
from underlying diversity in consumer preferences. Further, many formal models in eco-
nomic geography directly incorporate a benefit of diversity through complementarity in
the production function. Rather than highlighting the role of diversity in production, our
arguments stress that there may be benefits of diversity on the demand side. That such
benefits play an important role in large multi-cultural cities has been eloquently if infor-
mally suggested in Diamond et al. (2004). In other related work, Glaeser et al. (2001) have
discussed the importance of amenities and the growth of “consumer cities”; our framework
can provide a micro-foundation and suggests that diversity per se may play an important
role.
1 Model
We introduce a model with a monopoly producer of a single complex good, which is priced
at p. This good has two diﬀerent characteristics or dimensions (a and b). Every unit of
the good can be of high or low quality in each of its two dimensions. The eﬀective quality
realization of each of them is stochastic.6 For one of the characteristics the probability of
high quality is fixed, but for the other it depends on the firm’s investment.7 Consumers
3 Indeed, the model delivers the result considering an investment decision in only one dimension.
4See also Sakai (1985), Gal-Or (1988), Mirman et al. (1994) and Harrington (1995).
5Building on similar intuitions arising in Cremer (1995) and Dewatripont and Maskin (1995).
6The stochastic realization can be viewed either as reflecting the nature of the production technology
or as reflecting idiosyncratic consumer tastes. In this latter case, higher investments in quality cater to a
wider range of such tastes.
7 It is reasonable to think that firms choose how much to invest in each of the dimensions. This is a
simplifying assumption that leads to an analytically simpler model without changing any of the substantial
results.
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incur costs in determining the quality of an attribute before making a purchase decision.
Timing is as follows:
1. The firm invests e in the quality of attribute b.
2. Each customer, without observing the firm investment decision, chooses to assess the
quality realization on none, one, or the other attribute.
3. Each customer chooses whether or not to buy the good.
Specifically we make the following assumptions with respect to the firm and consumers:
Firm
The firm invests e ≥ 0 in the quality of attribute b at a cost of e24 . This is a sunk cost
that is incurred regardless of the number of sales. The marginal cost of production is 0.
Production leads to stochastic quality realizations, where qi ∈ {0, 1} denotes the quality
realization of the good in attribute i ∈ {a, b} . While the probability of high quality, qa = 1,
in attribute a is exogenous, for attribute b it depends on the firm’s investment. Specifically,
we suppose that Prob(qa = 1) = 12 and Prob(qb = 1) = e. Note that stochastic realizations
of quality give consumers some incentives for assessing it.
The firm’s only choice is the level of investment in quality b (which is e), since we assume
that the price of the good p is exogenous. The exposition is much less straightforward
but similar eﬀects arise and similar qualitative results can be shown when the price is
endogenous. Moreover, there are important markets, including healthcare and state-funded
education, where the assumption of an exogenous price from the perspective of firms and
consumers may be appropriate.
Consumers
There is a continuum of ex-ante heterogeneous consumers indexed by t, where t is
uniformly distributed on [0, 1].8 Consumer t when buying one unit of the good with quality
qa on attribute a and qb on attribute b at a price p gets a utility of tqa+(1− t)qb−p. That
is, all consumers value both dimensions of the good, but consumers with a high t give more
importance to attribute a while consumers with a low t give more importance to attribute
b.
Consumers cannot directly observe the quality of a good in each dimension; however,
they can incur some search costs to assess the quality realization of either dimension. In
particular, by incurring a cost A, a consumer can perfectly determine whether the quality
8We present a model in which consumers are heterogeneous in tastes. Similarly one could think of
consumers with homogeneous tastes who are heterogeneous in their search costs.
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on dimension a is high or low, and by incurring a cost B she can perfectly learn the quality
on dimension b.
We suppose that the consumer can search either in one dimension or the other. She may
also choose to buy without assessing quality or choose to neither assess quality nor buy.
We preclude the possibility of searching on both dimensions before making a decision.9
If the realization of the quality and the consumer’s assessment behavior leads the con-
sumer to purchase a good of quality (qa, qb) at the price p, her overall utility can be written
as:
Ut = tqa + (1− t)qb − p−AIs=a −BIs=b (1)
where Is=a takes the value 1 if and only if the consumer assessed dimension a and takes
the value 0 otherwise; Is=b is similarly defined. If the consumer does not buy the good,
her utility is simply
Ut = −AIs=a −BIs=b. (2)
We now move on to characterize the equilibrium search strategies of consumers and the
firm’s quality investments.
2 Equilibrium analysis
We characterize the optimal behavior, first of consumers then of the firm and bring these
together to determine equilibrium.
2.1 Consumers
In general, a consumer of type t has four choices: assessing characteristic b, assessing
characteristic a, buying without assessing, and simply not buying the good.10 Among the
four, she chooses whichever gives highest utility. What is crucial for determining the firm’s
behavior is the fraction of consumers who assess characteristic b. Suppose that there is some
consumer T who is indiﬀerent between assessing b and the best of her other choices, when
anticipating that the firm will invest e. Assuming that T is interior then, it is implicitly
9This last assumption is for simplicity and is not crucial: For an agent assessing characteristic b, con-
ditional on doing so there is less to be gained from searching on a, and so the propensity to do so would
be diminished. Thus even if agents had the opportunity to search on both dimensions, there would still be
consumers who switch from searching on a to searching on b; and these are the key driving force in our
analysis. Moreover, the assumption may be appropriate in itself if consumers face a time constraint that
makes searching on a second dimension prohibitively expensive (or if there are other decreasing returns to
searching on both dimensions).
10Note that a consumer who decides to assess one of the characteristics purchases if and only if the
realization is high. Otherwise, she would be better oﬀ taking the same unconditional purchasing decision
without paying the search cost.
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defined by the equation:
e(1− T + 1
2
T − p)−B = max{1
2
(T + (1− T )e− p)−A, 1
2
T + (1− T )e− p, 0} (3)
Note that consumers with t < T prefer to search on dimension b and purchase if and only
if they discover high quality on that dimension. In our analysis, we focus on instances in
which all consumers with t > T search on dimension a.11 In these circumstances, assessing
a gives the highest value among the alternatives on the right hand side of Equation (3)
and we obtain:
T = p (1− 2e) + e− 2(B −A). (4)
Note that the threshold T can take any value between zero and one. A value T = 0
would correspond to all agents searching on dimension a, while T = 1 would correspond to
all agents searching on dimension b.
2.2 Firm
The firm chooses an investment in quality e, in order to maximize profits given the an-
ticipated equilibrium behavior of consumers. A proportion T of the consumers search on
dimension b, buying whenever they find high quality on that dimension (which occurs with
probability e and so is influenced by the firm’s choice of investment). The remaining (1−T )
consumers search on dimension a and buy if and only if they find high quality (which occurs
with probability 12).
The firm’s problem can be expressed as:
max
e
Π = ((1− T )1
2
+ Te)p− e
2
4
. (5)
The first order condition with respect to e can therefore be written down as follows:
Tp− 1
2
e = 0. (6)
In particular, we obtain:
e = 2pT . (7)
11We later discuss other possible equilibria.
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2.3 Equilibrium
Conditions (7) and (4) determine the equilibrium values of T and e in terms of the exoge-
nous parameters of the model (A,B and p):
T =
2(A−B) + p
1− 2p+ 4p2 (8)
e=2p
2(A−B) + p
1− 2p+ 4p2 . (9)
We can use the equilibrium values of T and e to compute the value of expected profits,
consumer surplus, and total welfare:
Π= p((1− T )1
2
+ Te)− e
2
4
(10)
CS =
Z T
0
(e(1− x+ x
2
− p)−B)dx+
Z 1
T
(
1
2
(x+ (1− x)e− p)−A)dx (11)
W =Π+ CS, (12)
where the first integral in the consumer surplus corresponds to the fraction T of consumers
who search on dimension b and the second corresponds to the fraction of consumers who
search on dimension a. Adding together expressions (11) and (10), substituting e = 2pT
from Equation (7), and simplifying, we can express total welfare as:
W =
1
4
(1− T 2 + 2pT ) + p(1− p)T 2 −A(1− T )−BT . (13)
The relationship between welfare and search costs is complex, as it depends not only
on the direct eﬀects of the cost of searching (A or B), but also on the aggregate search
behavior of consumers (summarized by T ) and the change in quality provision by the firm
(e = 2pT ). We characterize these eﬀects in detail in Section 3 where diﬀerent net eﬀects
may be observed.
Note that alternative equilibria may exist simultaneously (for example, one in which
there is no investment and no assessment of dimension b; or another in which the threshold
consumer T is indiﬀerent between assessing b and not buying the good). However, it can
be verified that in the parameter range we consider below, the equilibrium studied here
generates both higher consumer surplus and higher profits than any other equilibrium.
3 Comparative Statics
Our interest is in the comparative statics of welfare with respect to A, the cost of assessing
attribute a. We consider the case where e and T are interior and all agents assess one or
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other of the characteristics. Equation (13) defines welfare, and Equations (8) and (9) fully
characterize equilibrium. Rather than diﬀerentiating W directly, we begin by examining
how a rise in the cost of assessing attribute A aﬀects the firm’s profits and the consumer
surplus. Beginning with firm profits:
dΠ
dA
=
∂Π
∂T
dT
dA
+
∂Π
∂e
de
dA
=
∂Π
∂T
dT
dA
, (14)
since ∂Π∂e = 0, as e is chosen to maximize the firm’s profits. Thus,
dΠ
dA
= p(e− 1
2
)
2
1− 2p+ 4p2 (15)
Given that dTdA =
2
1−2p+4p2 > 0, it follows that
dΠ
dA > 0 if and only if e >
1
2 . This
result captures the ineﬃciency of quality produced but not consumed: a rise in the cost
of assessing a drives more consumers to assess characteristic b, this increases firm profits
whenever high quality is more likely to be realized on characteristic b (that is where e > 12),
and reduces profits in the opposite case. Thus dΠdA may be either positive (when e is
suﬃciently high, which requires many consumers to be searching on dimension b, which in
turn is likely when A is high) or negative. As the equilibrium level of investment increases
with A, overall profits may be non-monotonic in A.
Next turning to consumer surplus, the total derivative with respect to A yields:
dCS
dA
=
∂CS
∂A
+
∂CS
∂T
dT
dA
+
∂CS
∂e
de
dA
(16)
We consider each term of this expression in turn.
First, the direct eﬀect of a rise in the cost of assessing characteristic A is negative: for
those assessing characteristic a an increase in the cost of doing so reduces their utility.
Analytically, ∂CS∂A = −(1− T ).
Next, ∂CS∂T = 0, that is, there is no direct eﬀect on consumer surplus of a marginal
increase in T. Such an increase shifts the T consumer, previously assessing attribute a, to
assess attribute b instead. But this consumer was indiﬀerent between searching on one or
the other dimension, thus her welfare is not aﬀected.
Finally, the indirect eﬀect of raising A through the firm’s investment e on consumer
surplus is unambiguously positive. The eﬀect of a change inA in the equilibrium investment
e is positive, as one can verify from Equation (9). Given this, for those assessing b, there is a
greater likelihood of finding quality, and for those assessing a, there is a higher likelihood of
enjoying quality on the dimension that they do not assess. Note that this is the externality
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that generates a “benefit of diversity” to consumers, alluded to in the introduction.12 More
formally,
de
dA
=
8p2
1− 2p+ 4p2 > 0 (17)
∂CS
∂e
=
Z T
0
(1− x
2
− p)dx+
Z 1
T
1
2
(1− x)dx = T (1
2
− p) + 1
4
> 0 (18)
The second integral is positive trivially. Consider the first: (1− x2 − p) must be positive in
the range [0, T ] for those consumers to have an incentive to search.13
Putting these elements together, overall we can write:
dCS
dA
= −(1− T ) + (T (1
2
− p) + 1
4
)
8p2
1− 2p+ 4p2 . (19)
Since the first term is negative and the second term is positive, in general, we cannot
sign dCSdA , and, indeed, it may be non-monotonic. Note, however, that when T is close to 1
(that is most consumers are searching on attribute b), which is likely when A is relatively
high, the direct eﬀect of a change in A is negligible, and so consumer surplus increases in
A. Conversely, as can readily be verified, if most consumers are searching on dimension a,
the direct eﬀect dominates and consumer surplus decreases in A.
We can finally turn to welfare. The discussion above allows us to conclude that welfare
may be non-monotonic in the cost of assessing a. In particular, we have argued that both
profits and consumer surplus are likely to be increasing in A when the cost of assessing
quality on dimension a is relatively high; and decreasing when A is relatively low. There-
fore, this should also hold for welfare. We illustrate that this is indeed the case when
p = 0.6 and B = 0.05 through the following graph.
12 In the model since the probability of quality in characteristic a is fixed, it is not diversity per se that
benefits consumers through these externalities, but rather that more assess characteristic b and so lead the
firm to invest more in this characteristic. Allowing for investments in both dimensions allows for a benefit
of diversity per se.
13Note that from Equation (3) e(1− t2 − p) ≥ B > 0 at t = T in equilibrium and further note that it is
increasing in t in the range [0, T ].
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Decomposing the eﬀect on welfare overall into the eﬀects through firm profits and
consumer surplus separately, it can further be shown that both profit and consumer surplus
are non-monotonic in the cost of assessing attribute a; and, in particular, that both are
decreasing for suﬃciently low values of A and increasing for high values.14
This achieves the main goal of this paper. We have shown that a reduction of the
search costs can be detrimental for welfare. This is the result of a lack of coordination,
or commitment, by all parties: the firm and every single consumer. If A goes down, all
parties expect others to put “less attention” to dimension b. These expectations reinforce
each other and, as a consequence, on equilibrium there is both less eﬀort (by firms) and
less searching (by consumers) devoted to characteristic b. This reduces the value of the
resulting good and ends up hurting everyone.
4 Final Remarks
The model highlights a number of eﬀects at work in consumer markets for goods with
multiple dimensions in a stylized and transparent way. We have stressed, in particular, two
counter-acting eﬀects of increasing the diversity in consumer behavior. First, consumers
benefit from enjoying quality on characteristics that they had not assessed; and second, high
quality realizations may be left undiscovered. Since consumers have no way of internalizing
the eﬀect of their aggregate choices on the firm’s investment in quality, a change in these
choices induced by a fall in the costs of information on product quality can reduce welfare.
This seems to accord with the evidence that there have been adverse welfare eﬀects in the
context of health markets (Dranove et al (2001)), and, with the popular perception in the
cases of business schoosl and wine rankings.
In addition, the model serves as a starting point for a number of interesting extensions.
14Specifically, here, profit takes its minimum at A = 0.001 and consumer surplus takes its minimum at
A = 0.147.
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First, the model can be extended to allow the firm to choose investments in each of the
quality characteristics. One can show that the qualitative insights of this paper still apply;
however, at a cost of a more complicated analysis. It is worth reiterating that even in this
case, when the firm has to allocate eﬀort to a number of diﬀerent tasks, the implied welfare
ineﬃciencies would not be a consequence of the multi-tasking setting. As we highlighted
in the introduction, we focus on market forces, as opposed to the typical principal-agent
contracting framework considered in Holmstrom and Milgrom (94), and do not rely on any
substitutability across tasks in the firm cost technology. Such subsititutability in the cost
function, if there were any, would only reinforce our eﬀects.
Another natural extension of the model is to allow for competition among producers.
Competition in quality provision can be studied within our framework. It generates similar
results without bringing additional economic insights, and complicates the analysis sub-
stantially. Competition in prices is a much more subtle extension. Depending on technical
assumptions regarding the timing of the decisions and the information gathering technol-
ogy considered one encounters diﬀerent complications, including signalling and existence
of equilibria.
Next, interesting dynamic implications arise if we allow consumer strategies and firm
investments to change at diﬀerent rates. In particular, a fall in the cost of acquiring infor-
mation could initially raise consumer surplus and overall welfare. However, the subsequent
reaction of the firm to the consumers’ new search behavior may lead to a reduction in
welfare in the long run. This will be the case even when all agents are fully aware of these
mechanisms due to the inability of consumers to coordinate and commit to an aggregate as-
sessment strategy. This might explain why policies or innovations such as the introduction
of school league tables in the UK, while initially welcomed are eventually reviled.
We have treated the cost of acquiring information as exogenous, there are a number of
ways in which one could envisage endogenizing it. In particular, it would be interesting
to extend the model and allow the firm to aﬀect the consumer assessment technology, and
in particular its costs. This may lead to predictions on whether these channels would be
used to highlight, or to the contrary, obfuscate particular product characteristics. This
seems to be a salient issue in reality. Think for example of informative advertising, or
commitments to regular information disclosure, or, returning to the business school example
of the introduction, on HBS and Wharton’s recent decision not to convey any information
to one of the rankings (Bradshaw (2005)).
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